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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Trent M.G. Petersen appeals from the district court's order relinquishing 
jurisdiction. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
Petersen issued 14 insufficient funds checks during June and July 2007 
for goods and services worth over $1500.00. (R., p. 21; PSI, p. 2.) The state 
charged him with two felony counts of Issuing Insufficient Fund Checks. (R., pp. 
20-21 .) Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Petersen pled guilty to one 
count of Issuing Insufficient Fund Checks and the other count was dismissed. 
(R., pp. 38-39.) On August 18, 2008, Petersen was sentenced to a unified 
sentence of three years with one year determinate. (R., pp. 49-52.) The court 
retained jurisdiction for 180 days pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(4). (R., pp. 50-51.) 
Due to proceedings in seveial other ciises in other coiinties, Petersen 
never attended the rider program at the Department of Correction. (R., pp. 54- 
58; Tr., p. 43, L. 4 - p. 44, L. 15.) On February 25, 2009, 191 days after the 
court retained jurisdiction, the district court decided that, due to Petersen never 
attending his rider, that it would utilize the additional 30 days provision of I.C. § 
19-2604(4). (R., p. 54.) The district court ordered: 
The Court's jurisdiction in this matter ends on February 7, 2009, at 
which time the Defendant must be brought before the Court for a 
rider review. However, due to the defendant being sent to 
Bonnevilie County and not on his rider as ordered by the Court and 
miscalculation of retained jurisdiction time, the Court, in its 
discretion and pursuant to the authority conferred upon the Court 
by I.C. 19-2601(4), extends the period of retained jurisdiction for 
thirty (30) days, in order to properly dispose of this matter. Id. 
(R., p. 54.) Thereafter, the district court issued an order to transport Petersen to 
Elmore County for a hearing to be held on March 2, 2009. (R., p. 56.) 
On March 2, 2009, 196 days after the court retained jurisdiction, Petersen 
returned to Elmore County for his review hearing. (R., pp. 58-60.) At that 
hearing, the state asserted that the district court lost jurisdiction upon expiration 
of the initial 180 day term. (Tr., p. 49, L. 18 - p. 50, L. 15.) The defense argued 
that the district court could retain jurisdiction in the matter for the additional 30 
days. (Tr., p. 45, Ls. 4-24.) The district court concluded that it had lost 
jurisdiction over Petersen but set the matter for a second hearing to give the 
state and defense adequate time to brief the issue. (Tr., p. 46, L. 12 - p. 52, L. 
25.) 
A second hearing was held on March 16, 2009, 210 days after Petersen's 
sentencing. (R., p. 74.) At that hearing, the state 2nd defense aigued theii 
respective positions. (Tr., p. 56, L. 5 - p. 60, L. 19; p. 61, L. 1 - p. 62, L. 6.) 
Ultimately, the district court concluded: 
But I don't believe that a statute that says your jurisdiction 
expires at 180 days unless you extend your jurisdiction allows you 
to go to [the 18Ist] day and then extend your jurisdiction beyond 
that time. I think you have to make that determination within the 
180 day period. 
From my standpoint, this Court would love to have the law 
say that yes, that if you receive it any time within 210 days you can 
act. But I don't think that's what the law is unless the Supreme 
Court wants to rule that way. And until they do I think I'm bound by 
the fact that the jurisdiction expired at 180 days. When jurisdiction 
expires it expires. I no longer have the authority to enter any order 
in this case. The defendant is in the custody of the Idaho 
Department of Corrections. So based upon that the Court will 
relinquish its jurisdiction. 
(Tr., p. 65, L. 15-p.66, L.20.) 
The district court entered its order relinquishing jurisdiction on March 17, 
2009. (R., pp. 76-79.) in that order, the district court explained: 
The Court found that due to the defendant being held in Eastern 
ldaho during the entire time of his rider and that the Court not being 
advised of this fact by the State, the defendant, defense counsel, or 
Eastern ldaho authorities until after the period of 180 days during 
which the Court retained jurisdiction that even though the March 16, 
2009 date would represent 210 days from the date the Court 
retained jurisdiction had the Court exercised its power to retain 
jurisdiction for an additional 30 days that no request having been 
made before the initial period of 180 days had expired that the 
Court had no jurisdiction to extend jurisdiction by 30 days either 
upon it's own motion or upon motion of the parties and thus 
jurisdiction was relinquished by operation of law. 
(R., pp. 76-77.) 
The following day, Petersen filed a motion to reduce his sentence 
pursuant to Rule 35 (R., pp. 80-81), which was denied by the district court 
without a hearing (R., pp. 11 5-1 8). Petersen timely appealed the court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp. 82-85.) 
ISSUES 
Petersen states the issues on appeal as: 
Whether the district court retained juilsdiction, or otherwise 
retained the authority, to place Mr. Petersen on probation within 
thirty (30) days after the purported expiration of the initial 180 days 
of the statutory period of retained jurisdiction. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Petersen failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded 
that its jurisdiction ended by operation of law upon the expiration of the initial 180 
day period of retained jurisdiction? 
ARGUMENT 
Petersen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It 
Relincluished His Jurisdiction U ~ o n  Expiration Of His Initial 180 Day Period Of 
Retained Jurisdiction 
A. Introduction 
Petersen asserts that the district court erred when it determined that it lost 
jurisdiction to place Petersen on probation after his initial 180 day period of 
retained jurisdiction expired. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Petersen's argument is 
three-fold. First, he argues that because the statute grants a district court the 
power to extend jurisdiction for an additional 30 days the district court did not 
lose jurisdiction after the initial 180 day period of retained jurisdiction expired. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-17.) This argument fails, however, because the plain 
language of the statute requires the court to exercise its extended jurisdiction 
prior to the expiration of the original 180 day period. Next, Petersen argues that 
the district court retained the "inherent authority" to place him on probation even 
though the court's statutory jurisdiction had expired. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17- 
19.) Finally, Petersen asserts that the district court had the authority to place him 
on probation because Petersen was never actually taken into the custody of the 
Department of Correction and, thus, the statutory period of retained jurisdiction 
never ran. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-22.) These arguments are also without 
merit. 
B. Standard of Review 
The construction and application of a statute presents a question of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Robinson, 143 
ldaho 306, 307, 142 P.3d 729, 730 (2006); State v. Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 
362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). "Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of 
law that may be raised at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free 
review." State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citation 
omitted). 
C. The District Court Prooerlv Concluded That It Did Not Have Jurisdiction To 
Place Petersen On Probation More Than 180 Days Afier His Initial Term 
Of Retained Jurisdiction Expired 
It is a well-settled principle of ldaho law that, absent a specific grant of 
authority, a district court's jurisdiction to alter an otherwise lawful sentence 
terminates upon execution of the sentence by the transfer of the defendant to the 
board of correction. State v. Johnson, 75 ldaho 157, 161, 269 P.2d 769, 
771 (1954); State v. Williams, 126 ldaho 39, 43, 878 P.2d 213, 217 (Ct. App. 
1994). ldaho Code § 19-2601(4) contains such a specific grant of authority. It 
authorizes a district court to retain jiiiisdiciion over a defendant who has been 
convicted and sentenced to a period of incarceration in the custody of fhe board 
of correction. It reads, in relevant part: 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a 
plea of guilty, in any district court of the state of ldaho, of or to any 
crime against the laws of the state, except those of treason or 
murder, the court in its discretion, may: 
4. Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time 
during the first one hundred eighty (180) days of a sentence to the 
custody of the state board of correction. The court shall retain 
jurisdiction over the prisoner for the first one hundred eighty (180) 
days or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until the juvenile reaches 
twenty-one (21) years of age. The prisoner will remain committed 
to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by 
the court. In extraordinary circumstances, where the court 
concludes that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant 
information within the one hundred eighty (180) day period of 
retained jurisdiction, or where the court concludes that a 
hearing is required and is unable to obtain the defendant's 
presence for such a hearing within such period, the court may 
decide whether to place the defendant on probation or release 
jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) 
days, after the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained 
jurisdiction has expired. 
I.C. § 19-2601(4) (emphasis added). By authorizing a district court to retain 
jurisdiction for 180 days after the execution of sentence has been ordered, this 
statute "creates an exception to the general rule that the court loses jurisdiction 
from the moment execution of the sentence begins." Williams, 126 ldaho at 44, 
878 P.2d at 218. 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words. Schwartz, 
139 ldaho at 362, 79 P.3d at 721. Those words must be given their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning and the statute must be construed as a whole. !& Where 
the language of a staiiite is plain and uiiambigiious, :he Court iiiiist give effect to 
the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 
133 ldaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). The Court assumes that the 
legislature meant what is clearly stated in the statute, "[ujnless the result is 
palpably absurd." m, 133 ldaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. 
ldaho Code 3 19-2601 is plain and unambiguous. A district court's 
jurisdiction is limited to the first 180 days of a sentence. If, within that first 180 
days, the court does not affirmatively place the defendant on probation, the 
court's jurisdiction expires and the defendant remains committed to the board of 
correction. There is one exception, however, to the 180 day limitation: 
In extraordinary circumstances, where the court concludes 
that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information 
within the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained 
jurisdiction, or where the court concludes that a hearing is required 
and is unable to obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing 
within such period, the court may decide whether to place the 
defendant on probation or release jurisdiction within a reasonable 
time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after the one hundred eighty 
(180) day period of retained jurisdiction has expired. 
I.C. § 19-4901(4) (emphasis added). This sentence was added to the statute in 
2005 but did not otherwise change the statute as originally written. The 
amendment uses the present tense "is" rather than the past tense "was" to show 
that the district court must make the determination of extraordinary 
circumstances prior to the initial expiration of retained jurisdiction. Thus, the 
plain language of the statute requires the court to conclude, prior to the expiration 
of the 180 period, that extraordinary circumstances exist and that it is unable to 
obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the 180 day period of retained 
jurisdiction or that it is unable to obtain the defendant's presence within the $80 
day period. In either event, the district court must make the finding before 
expiration of the original 180 day period. The district court does not have the 
ability to make this finding afferthe 180 day period because it has lost jurisdiction 
and no longer has the power to make any findings. 
In his argument, Petersen utterly ignores the clause in the statute that lists 
the circumstances in which a court can extend jurisdiction for an additional 30 
days. (See, Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) This clause reads: "where the court 
concludes that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within 
the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction, or where the 
court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable to obtain the defendant's 
presence for such a hearing within such period ...." It is a fundamental principle 
of statutory interpretation that a statute must be construed so that effect is given 
to every word, clause and sentence of the statute. Athav v. Stacey, 142 ldaho 
360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005); State v. Baer, 132 ldaho 416, 417-18, 973 
P.3d 768, 769-70 (Ct. App. 1999). Here, by pretending that it does not exist, 
Petersen is asking this court to simply ignore the plain language of the statute. 
When this clause is included, Petersen's interpretation of the statute is 
illogical. It makes no sense to require the district court to conclude that it either 
cannot obtain or evaluate relevant information or obtain the Defendant's 
presence within the I80  day period, if such decisions were permitted to be made 
after the initial 180 day period expired. The statute would have necessarily used 
different language if such was the case. The plain language of the statute 
requires the extension of jurisdiction for "extraordinary purposes" to be made 
prior to the expiration of the initial 180 day retained jurisdiction period. 
Even if the district court could retain jurisdiction after the initial expiration 
of 180 period of retained jurisdiction, the district court found that "extraordinary 
circumstances" did not exist that would require the use of the additional 30 day 
period. It ruled: 
It has to be extraordinary circumstances. 
It has to be - I just can't believe that the Court of Appeals 
and the Supreme Court would hold that the fact that the Court was 
not advised by either the State or the Defense of the fact that this 
period of time was running and the defendant had not yet been sent 
on a rider would meet those extraordinary circumstances 
requirements. 
(Tr., p. 51,L. 20 - p. 52, L. 3.) 
In addition, the statute requires the district court to either find that it cannot 
obtain and evaluate relevant information within the 180 day period of retained 
jurisdiction or where the court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable 
to obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing within such period. I.C. 
19-2601(4). Here, the court made neither of these findings. Thus, Petersen's 
period of retained jurisdiction expired 180 days after he was initially placed on 
retained jurisdiction. 
Because the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no reason to 
examine its legislative history. However, a review of the legislative history does 
not support Petersen's position. The statement of purpose reads, in part: 
This bill would provide that a court that has retained 
jurisdiction may place a defendant on probation after the 180-day 
period has expired only where extraordinary circumstances exist 
that prevent the court from obtaining needed information or 
securing the defendant's prssence fcjr a hearing. Even then, the 
180-day period could be extended only for 30 days. This would 
resolve the existing uncertainty in the law and provide some leeway 
for sentencing courts in the small number of cases where such 
extraordinary circumstances are present. 
2005 House Bill 204, Statement of Purpose (attached as Appendix A). Clearly, 
the statute was amended to grant more flexibility to sentencing courts. However, 
the statement of purpose does not address when 'the district court must 
determine if extraordinary circumstances exist which justify an extension of 
jurisdiction, which is the sole issue in this appeal. Rather, the statement of 
purpose simply acknowledges that there are circumstances where an extension 
may be necessary. 
Finally, Petersen asserts that public policy considerations support his 
interpretation of the statute. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-17.) Petersen argues that 
placing appropriate offenders on probation is a significant state interest and that 
"providing sentencing courts an additional thirty (30) days to review relevant 
material that could not otherwise be reviewed, or to obtain the presence of a 
defendant who otherwise could not be present, the legislature has increased the 
likelihood that appropriate offenders will in fact receive probation." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 14.) Because the statute is plain and unambiguous, it is not necessary 
to examine the public policy behind the statute. Undoubtedly, the public policy 
behind the amendment to the statute was to permit sentencing courts more 
flexibility. However, nothing that Petersen has cited or argued requires a finding 
contrary to the plain language of the statute that requires the district court to 
make its decision prior to expiration of the original 180 day retained jurisdiction 
period. 
The plain language of the statute requires the court to conclude, prior to 
the expiration of the 180 period, that extraordinary circumstances exist and that it 
is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the 180 days 
period of retained jurisdiction or that it is unable to obtain the defendant's 
presence within the 180 day period. Thus, the district court lost jurisdiction over 
Petersen upon expiration of the initial 180 day period and did not err in 
concluding that he was unable to extend Petersen's jurisdiction for an additional 
30 days. 
D. Petersen's Claim That The District Court Retained Inherent Authority 
Throuqh The ldaho Constitution To Place Petersen On Probation Is 
Without Merit 
Petersen asserts that even if the district court's statutory jurisdiction had 
expired, that the court still possessed inherent authority to place him on probation 
pursuant to Article II, Section 1 and Article V, Section 13 of the ldaho 
Constitution. (Appellant's brief, p. 17.) However, the ldaho Supreme Court has 
consistently held that a sentencing court is vested only with authority granted to it 
by the legislature. State v. Funk, 123 ldaho 967, 969, 855 P.2d 52, 54 (1993) 
(citinq State v. McCoy, 94 ldaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971)). The only "power" 
district courts have to retain jurisdiction over a defendant is granted by I.C. § 19- 
2601(4). State v. Williams, 126 ldaho 39, 43, 878 P.2d 213,217 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("A district court's authority to retain jurisdiction over a convicted defendant who 
has been sentenced to the custody of the Board derives from I.C. § 19- 
2601 (4)"); State v. Taylor, 142 tdaho 30, 31, 121 P.3d 961, 962 (2005); State v. 
D&, 140 ldaho 238, 240, 91 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Ct. App. 2004). Once the 
period of retained jurisdiction authorized by I.C. § 19-2601(4) expires, and the 
district court has failed to affirmatively place the defendant on probation, the 
district court no longer has the "power" to do so. 
In arguing that the district court had "inherent authority" to place Petersen 
on probation, Petersen cites State v. Griffith, 140 ldaho 616, 618-19, 97 P.3d 
483, 485-86 (Ct. App. 2004). (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) However, his reliance on 
Griffith is misplaced. In m, the court of appeals addressed a district court's 
ability to set aside a judgment that was obtained by fraud. There is no allegation 
that Petersen's judgment was obtained by fraud, and Petersen claims no fraud. 
Rather, he advocates for a standard whereby the court may exercise inherent 
jurisdiction to reopen cases and to suspend sentences in appropriate cases. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 19.) The state submits that there is no legal basis for such a 
broad expansion of the court's powers; such an expansion would eviscerate the 
legal doctrines protecting finality of judgment and the general rule that a final 
judgment brings a court's jurisdiction to a close. Thus, Petersen's argument is 
without legal merit. 
Petersen's reliance on State v. McCoy, 94 ldaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 
(1971) (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19), is likewise misplaced. In McCoy, the ldaho 
Supreme Court was asked to review a statute which required a mandatory 
minimum sentence of ten days jail time for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
McCoy, 94 ldaho at 237, 486 P.2d at 248. The magistrate in that case had 
imposed the ten-day sentence and then suspended it and ptaced the defendant 
on probation. The state appealed, and the Supreme Court held that the 
mandatory minimum sentence requirement violated article 5, section 13 of the 
ldaho Constitution because it invaded the judiciary's inherent authority to 
suspend sentences. ld. 94 ldaho at 240,486 P.2d at 251. The Supreme Court 
focused its decision on the powers that a sentencing court had at common law, 
and its ability at common law to suspend a sentence and place an individual on 
probation at senfencing.' 94 ldaho at 238-40, 486 P.2d at 249-51. Here, 
' In response to McCoy, the state constitution was subsequently amended to 
specifically provide that "the legislature can provide mandatory minimum 
sentences" which cannot be reduced. ldaho Const., Art. V, 3 13. 
Petersen was already sentenced to a term in the custody the Department of 
Correction. He is asking this court to grossly expand the "inherent powers" of the 
district court to include his post-sentencing situation, but has provided no legal 
basis to do so. Thus, his argument is without merit. 
E. The District Court Lost Jurisdiction To Place Petersen On Probation 
Because The Statutory Period Of Retained Jurisdiction Had Run Even 
Thouaht Petersen Was Not In The Actual Phvsical Custodv Of The 
Department Of Correction 
Finally, Petersen asserts that the district court never lost jurisdiction to 
place him on probation because the $80-day period of concurrent jurisdiction is 
triggered only upon the Department of Correction taking actual custody of an 
offender. (Appellant's brief, p. 19.) This argument is also without merit. 
Petersen did not need to be physically transferred to the Department of 
Correction prior to 180 day period of retained jurisdiction commencing. 
The sentencing court, in its discretion, may: "Suspend the execution of the 
judgment at any time during the first T80 days of a sentence to the custody 
of the state board of correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the 
prisoner for the first one hundred eighty (180) days ...." I.C. § 19-2601(4) 
(emphasis added). The district court suspended the execution of Petersen's 
judgment at his sentencing on August 18, 2008. When an individual is 
sentenced to the custody of the Board of Correction, his term of confinement 
begins from the day of his sentence. I.C. 5 20-209A. Because Petersen started 
sewing his "sentence to the custody of the state board of correction" upon the 
issuance of his sentence, the 180 day period of retained jurisdiction commenced 
immediately upon sentencing. 
Petersen cites State v. McGoniaal, 122 ldaho 939, 842 P.2d 275 (1992), 
for the proposition that the district court retained the authority to place him on 
probation because he was never physically remanded to the custody of the 
Department of Correction. However, McGoniaal is inapposite to this case. 
McGonigai, immediately after being sentenced, threatened a police officer and 
the judge. McGoniaal, 122 ldaho at 940, 842 P.2d at 276. That afternoon, the 
court recalled the case, withdrew the sentence and imposed a new one. Id. On 
appeal, McGonigal asserted that the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
increase his sentence. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the court 
had jurisdiction to resentence him because he had not yet been placed in the 
custody of the Department of Correction. Id. Here, the issue is whether the 180 
day jurisdictional period of I.C. § 19-2601(4) had run, an issue never raised, and 
irrelevant to the issue actually raised, in McGoniqal. I.C. § 19-2601(4) does not 
grant jurisdiction based on physical custody, but rather during "the first 180 days 
of a sentence." There is no legal basis for the broad expansion of the holding of 
McGoni~al requested by Petersen and such an expansion is against the plain 
language of the statute. Thus, his argument is without merit. 
Petersen's position is also not supported by State v. Williams, 126 ldaho 
39, 878 P.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1994). The issue in Williams was whether the district 
court had the authority to retain jurisdiction upon revocation of the defendant's 
probation. Williams, 126 ldaho at 43, 878 P.2d at 217. The court of appeals 
concluded that the district court had such power. Id., 126 ldaho at 44, 878 P.2d 
at 218. Unlike Williams, Petersen was not placed on probation prior to the district 
court retaining jurisdiction and the holding of Williams is irrelevant to Petersen's 
situation. 
Petersen relies upon the cases cited in dicta in Williams: McGoniaai 
(discussed supra) and State v. Johnson, 101 ldaho 581,618 P.2d 759 (1980), in 
support of his contention that his retained jurisdiction did not automatically expire 
by operation of law because he was not in the custody of the Board of 
Correction. However, neither of these cases support his assertion. In Johnson, 
the defendant was given the opportunity to get his affairs in order prior to 
reporting to prison and fled. Johnson, 101 ldaho at 582-83, 618 P.2d at 760-61. 
Upon his recapture and return to court, the district court increased his sentence. 
Id., 101 ldaho at 585, 618 P.2d at 763. The Supreme Court held that the district 
-
court had jurisdiction to impose a greater sentence because he had not 
commenced sewing his original sentence. Id. Unlike Johnson, Petersen had 
commenced serving his original sentence and has given no reason to expand the 
holding of: Johnson to his situation. 
Under the plain language of the statute, Petersen's period of retained 
jurisdiction commenced upon his sentencing and expired 180 days later. 
Whether he was placed in the actual physical custody of the Department of 
Correction is irrelevant under the plain language of the statute. Thus, his 
argument that his 180 day period of retained jurisdiction never began to run 
because he was never in the physical custody of the board of correction and 
therefore, his jurisdiction was not relinquished by operation of law, is without 
merit. The district court did not err in relinquishing jurisdiction after more than 
180 days had passed since Petersen's sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction and ordering the underlying sentence executed. 
DATED this 27th day of April, 2010. 
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1 1 1 1  LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 1 1 1 1  
Fifty-eighth Legislature ~irst Regular session - 2005 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE BILL NO. 204 
BY JUDICIARY, RULES AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
I AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO COURT JURISDICTION; AMENDING SECTION 19-2601, IDAHO CODE, TO PRO- 
3 VIDE THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THE COURT MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO 
4 PLACE A DEFENDANT ON PROBATION OR RELEASE JURISDICTION WITHIN A REASONABLE 
5 TIME AFTER THE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY DAY PERIOD OF RETAINED JURISDICTION HAS 
6 EXPIRED. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2601, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
19-2601. COMMUTATION, SUSPENSION, WITHHOLDING OF SENTENCE - -  PROBATION, 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in 
any district court of the state of Pdaho, of or to any crime against the laws 
of the state, except those of treason.or murder, the court in its discretion, 
may : 
1. Commute the sentence and confine the defendant in the county jail, or, 
if the defendant is of proper age, commit the defendant to the custody of the 
state department of juvenile corrections; or 
2. Suspend the execution of the judgment at the time of judgment or at 
any time during the term of a sentence in the county jail and place the 
defendant on probation under such terms and conditions as it deems necessary 
and expedient; or 
3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe 
and may place the defendant on probation; or 
4 .  Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first one 
hundred eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of 
correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for the 
first one hundred eighty (180) days or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until 
the juvenile reaches twenty-one (21) years of age. The prisoner will remain 
committed to the hoard of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation 
by the court. In extraordinam circumstances, where the court concludes that 
it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the one 
hundred eiqhty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction, or where the court 
concludes that a hearinq is required and is unable to obtain the defendant's 
presence for such a hearinq within such period, the court may decide whether 
to place the defendant on probation or release jurisdiction within a reason- 
able time, not to exceed thirty (30).,days, after the one hundred eighty (180) 
day period of retained iurisdiction:has expired. Placement on probation shall 
be under such terms and conditions as the court deems necessary and expedient. 
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39 The court in its discretion may sentence a defendant to more than one (1) 
40 period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on probation 
4 1 in a case. In no case shall the board of correction or its agent, the depart- 
42 ment of correction, be required to hold a hearing of any kind with respect to 
4 3 a recommendation to the court for the grant or denial of probation. Probation 
. . 
is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court. Any recommendation made 
by the department to the court regarding the prisoner shall be in the nature 
of an addendum to the presentence report. The board of correction and its 
agency, the department of correction, and their employees shall not be held 
financially responsible for damages, injunctive or declaratory relief for any 
recommendation made to the district court under this section. 
5. If the crime involved is a felony and if judgment is withheld as pro- 
vided in subsection 3. of this section or if judgment and a sentence of cus- 
tody to the state board of correction is suspended at the time of judgment in 
accordance with subsection 2. of this section or as provided by subsection 4. 
of this section and the court shall. place the defendant upon probation, it 
shall he to the board of correction; to a county juvenile probation depart- 
ment, or any other person or persons the court, in its discretion, deems 
appropriate. 
6. If the crime involved is a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, or if 
the court should suspend any remaining portion of a jail sentence already com- 
muted in accordance with subsection 1. of this section, the court, if it 
grants probation, may place the defendant on probation. If the convicted per- 
son is a juvenile held for adult criminal proceedings, the court may order 
probation under the supervision of the county's juvenile probation department. 
7. The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under a 
conviction or plea of guilty for a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, may 
be for a period of not more than two (2) years; and under a conviction or plea 
of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be for a period of not more 
than the maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned. 
I Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Impact 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
I 
I This bill is intended to resolve the uncertainty that now exists as to 
when a sentencing court can make a decisidn.as to whether to place a 
defendant on probation following a period105 retained jurisdiction. 
Idaho Code 0 19-2601(4) provides that a sentencing court can retain 
jurisdiction over a defendant for 180 days, and that at any time 
during that period the court may place the defendant on probation. In 
State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 238, 91 P.3d 1142 (Ct. App. 2004), the 
Court of Appeals reaffirmed that a sentencing court loses jurisdiction 
over a defendant and may no longer place the defendant on probation 
when the 180-day period expires. The Court went on to say, however, 
"We deem it unnecessary to hold in this case that a sentencing court 
may never make a decision to place a defendant on probation within a 
reasonable time after the 180-day period of retained jurisdiction has 
expired where extraordinary circumstances exist that may explain or 
justify court action beyond the statutorily established period." 91 
P.3d at 1145. 
This bill would provide that a court that has retained jurisdiction I may place a defendant on probation after the 180-day period has 
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expired only where extraordinary circumstances exist that prevent the 
court from obtaining needed information or securing the defendant's 
presence for a hearing. Even then, the 180-day period could be 
extended only for 30 days. This would resolve the existing 
uncertainty in the law and provide some leewa$for sentencing courts 
in the small number of cases where such ekt'raordinary circumstances 
are present. 
I 
i FISCAL NOTE 
This bill would have no impact on the general fund. 
Contact Person: 
I 
Patricia Tobias 
1 Administrative Director of the Courts 
( 2 0 8 )  334 -2246  
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